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Reexamining the Seventh Amendment
Argument Against Issue Certification
D. McNamara, * B. Boghosian**
& L. Aminpour***
I. Introduction
Issue certification is a controversial means of handling aggregate
claims in Federal Courts. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”)
23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”1 Issue
certification has returned to the radar screen of academics,2 class action
counsel,3 and defendants.4 The Supreme Court’s decision regarding the
need for viable damage distribution models in Comcast v. Behrend5 may
spur class counsel in complex cases to bifurcate liability and damages.
* Douglas McNamara is Of Counsel at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, in
Washington, D.C. He is an adjunct faculty member of George Washington University
Law School and has practiced sixteen years in the area of complex civil litigation and
class actions.
** Blake Boghossian is a J.D. candidate at George Washington University Law School.
*** Leila Aminpour graduated from George Washington University Law School and
now works at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Prior to joining the
CFPB, she was the Consumer Protection Fellow at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll. Her
co-authorship of this article is the result of her independent research at Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll and does not necessarily represent the views of the CFPB or the United
States.
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
2. Recent publications supporting revitalizing issue certification include Jenna C.
Smith, “Carving at the Joints”: Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class
Actions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2013); John C. Coffee, Jr., The New Class Action
Landscape: A Trail Map to Class Certification and Practice in the Era After Wal-Mart
and Concepcion, in THE 15TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS (Am.
Bar Ass’n 2011).
3. Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 733, 744 (2013).
4. JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER & JORDAN SCHWARTZ, U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, A ROADMAP FOR REFORM: LESSONS FROM EIGHT
YEARS OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT 15 (2013).
5. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1436-37 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) as a possible response to heightened
certification requirements).
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The successes of tobacco-injury plaintiffs in Florida’s Engle v. Liggett
Group cases show that personal injury actions can make use of issue
class actions.6
Class defendants often assert three common arguments against issue
certification. First, certifying a class as to certain issues would make
class certifications too easy, circumventing the requirements for
predominance and superiority under FRCP Rule 23(b)(3).7 This
argument has been extensively analyzed and criticized by several courts
as disregarding the text of Rule 23 and the Advisory Committee’s
commentary.8 Another common argument against issue certification is
that class treatment and trial on the common issues will not advance a
case, and is not worth the trouble.9 However, making all individuals
relitigate the common issues repeatedly is even more inefficient.10 A
third argument posited against issue certification—and the one addressed
in depth here—relates to the Seventh Amendment and the reexamination clause.
Until 1995, the Seventh Amendment and class certification
coexisted with little discussion. Then, a federal appellate court
decertified a class of HIV-infected hemophiliacs who sought a class
action trial of the common issues of their claims against blood factor
manufacturers.11 Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, supported the ruling on several grounds, including that
6. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1269-77 (Fla. 2006) (permitting
class decision on tort liability, general causation and conspiracy to stand, but requiring
individual smokers to prove specific causation and damages).
7. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Perry, supra note
3, at 744.
8. See, e.g., In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that a court may certify a class as to a particular issue despite the fact that
plaintiffs’ claims taken together do not satisfy Rule 23’s predominance requirement);
Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004); Gunnells v. Healthplan
Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The dissent would require a court
considering the manageability of a class action—a requirement for predominance under
Rule 23(b)(3)(D)—to pretend that subsection (c)(4)—a provision specifically included to
make a class action more manageable—does not exist until after the manageability
determination is made. . . . This reading leaves subsection (c)(4)(A) without any practical
application, thereby rendering it superfluous.”).
9. Jones v. Allercare, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 290, 292 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (noting even a
successful finding on “general causation” would not “necessarily advance the interests of
the members of the class.”).
10. Jon Romberg, Half A Loaf Is Predominant and Superior To None: Class
Certification Of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(C)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 250
(2002).
11. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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the proposed bifurcated proceedings could run afoul of the Seventh
Amendment’s imperative that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.”12 The court posited that a class jury ruling on
the matter of negligence of the blood factor manufacturers in the case
might be reexamined when, in the proposed individual trials, subsequent
juries considered the plaintiff’s conduct on the issue of comparative
negligence.13 This decision, In re Rhone Poulenc, became the dominant
precedent cited by courts that subsequently denied attempts to partially
certify class actions under FRCP 23(c)(4).14 As a result, issue
certification, both as a tool for federal courts to manage complex
litigation and as a means for plaintiffs seeking streamlining of their suits
against deep-pocketed defendants, fell mostly into desuetude.
The Seventh Circuit got the Seventh Amendment wrong. Critics
and jurists exploring the historical basis for the Seventh Amendment
have demonstrated that the Seventh Amendment was included in the Bill
of Rights to prevent the federal courts from re-litigating entire claims
already decided by a state court.15 The drafters of the Seventh
Amendment were not focusing on the potential for federal juries to
review overlapping evidence and reading conflicting results.16 However,
the reexamination argument set out in Rhone Poulenc suffers from even
more basic weaknesses; chiefly that the defendant raising the Seventh
Amendment argument pre-certification has suffered no Seventh
Amendment privation at that time, and likely would only see their loss
reexamined to their benefit if a careless judge or rogue jury did revisit
common issues decided by the class jury. The Seventh Amendment
argument is sorely speculative and cannot justify denying issue
12. The full text of the Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
13. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d at 1303.
14. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); infra note
36.
15. See, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D 86, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Romberg,
supra note 10, at 250; Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation And The Seventh
Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1998).
16. See supra note 15.
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certification.
Issue certification does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment
because of the constitutional doctrines of standing and ripeness. Part
II(A) and II(B) examines FRCP 23 and the history of class actions and
issue certifications. Next, Part II(C) analyzes Rhone Poulenc and its
Seventh Amendment analysis. Part III(A) argues that ripeness and
standing undermine Seventh Amendment arguments concerning
reexamination. First, as to ripeness, the reexamination argument relies
on a series of speculations: that the class plaintiffs will prevail on the
trial of the common issues; and that a second jury would—contrary to
legal presumptions17 — ignore the trial judge’s instructions, and then
reexamine some part of the class decision. These multiple suppositions
should not preclude issue classes. Second, even if the matter becomes
ripe, the defendant will still lack standing: it is only when the issue-class
plaintiff prevails on the first round that a second jury could exist. If the
second jury spurns the trial court’s instructions by revisiting issues
decided in the first trial, that reexamination would likely redound to the
defendant’s benefit, diminishing in some manner the common issue
finding favoring the class plaintiffs. Thus, the defendants would lack
standing to advance a Seventh Amendment claim because the defendants
would suffer no harm. Finally, Part III(B) notes that the class
plaintiffs—the likely potential victims of any jury reexamination—can
avoid a Seventh Amendment complaint by voluntarily and knowingly
waiving violations, just as American citizens can for any of their
constitutional rights.
II. Rule 23 And Issue Certification
A.

The Emergence of Class Actions

Justice Story—while serving as a circuit judge—developed the
elements of today’s modern class action..18 The Supreme Court adopted
17. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (noting “the almost
invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions . . . .”); Tennessee v.
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (noting the “crucial assumption that the jurors followed
the instructions given them by the trial judge”) (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S.
422, 438 n.6 (1983) (citations omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Woolley,
supra note 15, at 526 (explaining that courts generally presume that juries will follow
their instructions).
18. See West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721-23 (C.C.D. R.I. 1820) (No. 17424);
see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY P LEADINGS § 9 (3d ed. 1844)
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his standards,19 and then Congress codified them in the precursor to the
FRCP: the Federal Equity Rules.20 One of these precursors to FRCP 23,
Federal Equity Rule 38 of 1912, stated merely: “When the question is
one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the

(discussing the categories of class actions); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81
HARV. L. REV. 356, 376-77 (1967). The modern-day “class action” had probably existed
in some form long before Justice Story formulated his rules. As noted by Judge
Heartfield:
Although it appears that the modern-day class action was born
probably some time during the Middle Ages, there are reports of
ecclesiastical proceedings against numerous insects and animals
dating as early as A.D. 824. . . . Inhabitants of an area afflicted with
locusts, rats, weevils, or other depredators would petition the Church
for relief. The offending insects or rodents would be summoned to
court, and, upon their inevitable nonappearance, tried in abstentia
[sic], and ordered to cease and desist from their wrongful behavior
and to depart the area, or to suffer excommunication and church
anathemas.
Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946-47 (E.D. Tex. 2000)
(citations omitted).
19. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853). In handling a dispute
between the north and south factions of the United Methodist Church divided by slavery,
the court adopted Justice Story’s formulation as to suits in representative capacity:
The rule is well established that where the parties interested are
numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of
the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the
others; and a bill may also be maintained against a portion of a
numerous body of defendants, representing a common interest. . . .
Where the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their rights and
liabilities are so subject to change and fluctuation by death or
otherwise, that it would not be possible, without very great
inconvenience, to make all of them parties, and would oftentimes
prevent the prosecution of the suit to a hearing. For convenience,
therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits
a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the
decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court. The
legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being before the court
by representation, and especially where the subject-matter of the suit
is common to all, there can be very little danger but that the interest
of all will be properly protected and maintained.
Id. at 298-303.
20. Romberg, supra note 10, at 257.
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court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.”21 Based upon this
language in Federal Equity Rule 38 of 1912, and long before Rule 23’s
creation, courts engaged in what would now be called the kind of “issue
certification” that later courts found to be possible under Rule 23(c)(4).22
The purpose of Rule 23, therefore, was to articulate formal rules for
the consolidation of similar cases, as opposed to the earlier custom of
leaving this process up to the wide discretion of trial judges.23 Rule 23
imposed specific requirements such as numerosity, commonality,
providing adequate notice, etc., to any group seeking “class action”
certification.24 These requirements empowered judges to consolidate
claims in response to increasing strains upon judicial resources.25
B.

The Emergence of Issue Certifications under 23(c)(4)

In the 1966 amendments, Rule 23(c)(4) was revised to read, “When
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues.”26 The Advisory Committee provided as
an example “a fraud or similar case [where] the action may retain its
21. Id. (quoting Fed. Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912) (repealed 1938)).
22. See, e.g., Carnahan v. Peabody, 31 F.2d 311, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (holding that
a representative suit may be brought on behalf of a large number of a deceased’s heirs, in
order to determine the issue of whether a trust created by the deceased’s brothers was
invalid); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1297, 1300-01 (1932) (“Nothing in the nature of things prevents a law judge from
doing much more to bring about a convenient unification of parallel suits pending in his
court between different parties, and codes or practice acts often give him this power.
Thus a federal statute provides: ‘When causes of a like nature or relative to the same
question are pending before a court of the United States . . . the court may make such
orders and rules concerning proceedings therein as may be conformable to the usages of
courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the administration of justice, and may
consolidate said causes when it appears reasonable to do so.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 734
(1926), derived from 3 Stat. 21 (1813)).
23. Kaplan, supra note 18, at 376.
24. Id.; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997).
25. When FRCP Rule 23 was created in 1938, the principles of claim and issue
consolidation that existed in simple language within the Federal Equity Rules were
transformed into a series of rules that distinguished cases into categories, which were
often vague. Rule 23’s amendment in 1966 attempted to discard this vague language and
make the process more practical. See Kaplan, supra note 18, at 376-80.. As the drafters
amended the rules to make them more practical they also attempted to make them more
inclusive, rejecting early suggestions which would not have included some of the current
grounds for class action certification (specifically those under Rule 23(b)(3)). Id. at 394
(“This timid course was unthinkable in the face of the insistent need to improve the
methods of handling litigation affecting groups.”).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
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‘class’ character only through the adjudication of liability to the class;
the members of the class may thereafter be required to come in
individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims.”27 Thus,
Rule 23(c)(4) permits courts to resolve some parts of complex claims
piecemeal when all components of the claim are not eligible for class
certification.28
After the 1966 amendments, many courts certified “issue classes”
by treating the common issues of plaintiffs’ claims as a single triable
matter, severing individual examinations for subsequent trials.29 These
courts did not mention a potential Seventh Amendment conflict with
issue certification.30 However, the long tradition of class and issue
certifications that existed before and after the creation of Rule 23 was
severely chilled in the mid-1990’s.

27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee’s note.
28. Simon v. Phillip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 29-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The
framers of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) considered class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3)-characteristically disputes that involve numerous individual proofs of causation and
injury--particularly well suited for certification of fewer than all issues. Their conclusion
follows from the fact that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) assists in satisfying Rule 23(b)(3)’s additional
class certification requirements of predominance and superiority.”) (citations omitted).
29. See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir.
1993) (affirming certification in asbestos action of eight issues regarding defendants’
conduct because “[s]ignificant economies may be achieved by relieving [plaintiffs] of the
need to prove over and over when defendants knew or should have known of asbestos’
hazards, or whether defendants engaged in concerted efforts to conceal this knowledge,
or even whether certain of defendants’ products crumble and release dust . . . .”); Sterling
v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988) (in land contamination
case, stating that “[i]n mass tort accidents, the factual and legal issues of a defendant’s
liability do not differ dramatically from one plaintiff to the next” and using Rule
23(c)(4)(A) to certify issues of “the level and duration of chemical contamination, the
causal connection, if any, between the plaintiffs’ consumption of the contaminated water
and the type of injuries allegedly suffered, and the defendant’s liability” while leaving
individual proofs of amount of damages for later proceedings); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig.,
789 F.2d 996, 1008-09 (3d Cir. 1986) (approving certification of liability issues in
asbestos litigation because “[e]ven if the action thereafter ‘degenerates’ into a series of
individual damage suits, the result nevertheless works an improvement over the situation
in which the same separate suits require an adjudication on liability using the same
evidence over and over again.”); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 471 (5th
Cir. 1986) (affirming certification in asbestos personal injury action of “defense-related
questions” such as product identification, product defectiveness, gross negligence, and
“state of the art” defense); see generally In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No.
381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming certification of asbestos personal injury
settlement class based on centrality of question of military contractor defense).
30. See, e.g., Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 474 (asserting with little comment that
“Defendants’ constitutional challenges to bifurcation are . . . unavailing”).
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Rhone Poulenc and the Rejection of Issue Certification.

In 1995, the Seventh Circuit heard a mandamus appeal regarding a
class certification order issued by Judge Grady, who presided over a
multidistrict litigation of contaminated blood factor lawsuits.31 Plaintiffs
were hemophiliacs infected by AIDS who sued the blood factor
manufacturers under their respective state laws.32 Plaintiffs alleged that
over two thousand hemophiliacs died of AIDS, with as many as twenty
thousand possibly HIV-positive.33 Plaintiffs sought a national class
action on the issue of defendants’ liability, alleging that if the
manufacturers had been more vigilant with respect to screening donors
for hepatitis B, they would have decreased the likelihood of HIV
Plaintiffs also alleged that the
contaminating their products.34
manufacturers were slow to take on other measures that could have
prevented contamination.35 The trial court found too many differences
between the class members for certification under FRCP Rule 23(b)(3).36
However, the court ruled that a class could litigate the common question
of negligence, and then (if the defendants were found liable for
negligence), individual class members could try their remaining issues,
such as causation and damages.37 After the court issued an order under
Rule 23(c)(4), the defendants appealed via a writ of mandamus.38
The Seventh Circuit granted the mandamus petition and ruled that
the issue certification “exceeded the bounds of allowable judicial
discretion.”39 Judge Posner, writing for the majority, rested the decision
31. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995).
32. Id. at 1394.
33. Id. at 1296.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1296-97.
36. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 422 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
FRCP Rule 23(b)(3) allows for class treatment of a claim where the plaintiff can show
the perquisites of Rule 23(a) (numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of class
representative and counsel) as well as “the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
37. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 422-23.
38. Rule 23 was amended in 1998 to provide greater discretion to appellate courts
to review class certification rulings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
39. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303. The court came to this conclusion for
three reasons: First, the court asserted a policy argument, a “concern with forcing these
defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability, when it is
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on the reexamination clause of the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution.40 Judge Posner reasoned that a class trial on negligence
would inexorably lead to subsequent juries reexamining the same issues:
A second or subsequent jury might find that the
defendants’ failure to take precautions against infection
with Hepatitis B could not be thought the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs’ infection with HIV, a different
and unknown blood-borne virus. How the resulting
inconsistency between juries could be prevented escapes
us.41
The Rhone Poulenc court’s Seventh Amendment analysis relied
primarily upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Gasoline Products Co. v.
Champlin Refining Co.42 However, the Gasoline Produce decision says
little about the Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, its
purpose, and its application.
In Gasoline Products, the plaintiff sued for royalties under a
licensing contract regarding a patented process of manufacture.43 The
defendant (Champlin) counterclaimed for damages, alleging that the
plaintiff failed to perform a related contract to construct part of a plant.44
The district court refused to allow the jury to consider Champlin’s
counterclaim, and Gasoline Products won its royalty claim. 45 The First
Circuit reversed, finding Champlin had presented sufficient evidence for
its counterclaim.46 At the retrial, the parties stipuled to Gasoline

entirely feasible to allow a final, authoritative determination of their liability for the
colossal misfortune that has befallen the hemophiliac population to emerge from a
decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different standards
of liability, in different jurisdictions.” Id. at 1299. The second articulated concern was
more pragmatic: that the district judge, “propose[d] to have a jury determine the
negligence of the defendants under a legal standard that does not actually exist in the
world,” but is rather based on “the concept of ‘general’ common law.” Id. at 1300. The
third reason was that bifurcation in this case would lead to subsequent juries reexamining
the first jury’s findings, in violation of the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 1302.
40. Id. at 1303.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1303 (citing Gasoline Prods. Co., v. Champlin Refining Co, 283 U.S. 494
(1931)).
43. Gasoline Prods., 283 U.S. at 495.
44. Id.
45. Champlin Refining Co. v. Gasoline Prods. Co., 29 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1928).
46. Id.at 338-39.
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Product’s royalty damages .47 Champlin received a favorable verdict on
it counterclaim, but for a sum about $20,000 less than owed to Gasoline
Products.48 The First Circuit again reversed, agreeing with Champlin
that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on calculating
damages.49 The court vacated the verdict “only as to damages” and the
case was “remanded to that court for a new trial on the question of
defendant’s damages.”50 The court’s opinion did not reference the
Seventh Amendment.
On appeal, Gasoline Products claimed that by limiting the new trial
only to damages—and preventing it from arguing an absence of liability
under Champlin’s alleged contracts—the ruling violated its Seventh
Amendment rights to have a single jury hear the entire claim. 51 The
Supreme Court reviewed prior decisions on re-trials and partial verdicts,
and cited to the Seventh Amendment in passing.52 The Court rejected
Gasoline Product’s broad argument that any error found in a part of one
verdict necessitated a full retrial.53 In a holding with seemingly little
relevance to issue certification, the Court held “where the requirement of
a jury trial has been satisfied by a verdict according to law upon one
issue of fact, that requirement does not compel a new trial of that issue
even though another and separable issue must be tried again.”54
However, the Court found that the issue of damages, including profit loss
and mitigated damages, could not be separated from liability under the
counterclaim due to the confusing record and conflicting testimony. 55
Because the re-trial jury could not be instructed to assume material facts
essential to assess damages, a retrial on all aspects of the counterclaim
was ordered.56 Importantly, the Court relied on the Due Process Clause
for its full re-trial decision, and not the Seventh Amendment, finding
that “the question of damages on the counterclaim is so interwoven with
that of liability that the former cannot be submitted to the jury
independently of the latter without confusion and uncertainty, which

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Gasoline Prods.Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 39 F.2d 521, 521 (1930).
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497 (1931).
Id.
Id. at 500.
Id.at 499.
Id.at 500.
Id.
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would amount to a denial of a fair trial.”57
The Gasoline Products decision reveals little about the applicability
of the re-examination clause. In fact, it seems that on a cleaner record on
contract formation and loss mitigation, the Court may have upheld the
First Circuit’s decision limiting the re-trial to damages. Nevertheless,
subsequent courts and commentators generally accepted the RhonePoulenc analysis of the Seventh Amendment and Gasoline Products, and
applied it to later cases.58 The Fifth Circuit ran furthest with the Rhone
57. Gasoline Prod. Co., 283 U.S. at 500-01.
58. See, e.g., Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
the lower court impermissibly bifurcated the liability and damages issues in the action in
violation of the Seventh Amendment); Cimino v. Raymark Ind., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 32021 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant’s Seventh Amendment rights were violated
when a jury was not permitted to determine the amount of damages owed to each
plaintiff); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
certification of tobacco companies’ conspiracy to hide addictiveness of cigarettes and
whether nicotine was addictive, citing to state law differences and the Seventh
Amendment); In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 317 (N.D. Ohio
2007) (holding bifurcation not appropriate in products liability case because “[t]he
undersigned is not entirely confident that, were it to certify sua sponte a smaller class or
more limited issues, it would avoid” the reexamination problems encountered in RhonePoulenc); Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chem. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 315-16 (S.D. Ala.
2006) (rejecting issue certification, noting that the second jury would have to reconsider
defendant’s conduct when considering causation and damages); Benner v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 214 F.R.D. 157, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying issue certification
because issues of negligence and comparative negligence were too interrelated and
thereby certification would lead to violation of the Seventh Amendment); In re Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(denying issue certification because dividing litigation between general and specific
liability would violate the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause); Rink v.
Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 652 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“[E]ven if this Court were to
accept the Plaintiffs’ invitation to certify a class action limited only to the so-called
common issue of whether the Defendants delivered a defective product, and even if a jury
answered this question in the Plaintiffs’ favor, any subsequent mini-trial involving the
issue of whether the delivery of the defective product caused injury and damage to a
particular Plaintiff would necessarily have to involve all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the delivery of the product if the Defendants are to receive the benefit of
Florida’s law governing the apportionment of fault.”); O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc.,
197 F.R.D. 404, 415 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“[A] class trial on liability without any reference
to the limitations defense runs ‘the real risk . . . of a composite case being much stronger
than any plaintiff’s individual action would be . . . .’”); Cohn v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co.,189 F.R.D. 209, 219 (D. Conn. 1999) (denying certification because of the potential
for relitigating interrelated issues that would violate the Seventh Amendment); Emig v.
Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 379, 393 n.14, 395 (D. Kan. 1998) (The Court
“recognizes that there is some disagreement on whether trying a single plaintiff’s claims
to multiple juries violates defendants’ Seventh Amendment rights. However, reaching
that issue is not necessary because the court finds that there are sufficient reasons, other
than any Seventh Amendment concern, to deny certification.” The court denied FRCP
23(c)(4) certification where “the general causation questions of whether cigarettes cause
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Poulenc decision. In Castano v. American Tobacco Co., the court
certified a nationwide class of nicotine-addicted smokers.59 It noted the
“core liability issues” as whether the tobacco companies knew about
nicotine addiction and had deliberately suppressed other common
components of causes of action for fraud, elements of the consumer
protection claims, and the breach of warranty.60 The Fifth Circuit
reversed, concluding issue certification “would write the predominance
requirement [of FRCP 23(b)(3)] out of the rule, and any common issue
would predominate if it were common to all the individual trials.”61
Castano also cited to the Seventh Amendment and Rhone Poulenc to
decertify the class.62
In this line of case law, only courts within the Second Circuit
sounded a different note. In a prelude to a decision where he
contemplated the application of issue certification of to civil RICO
claims against cigarette companies, longtime District Court Judge Jack
Weinstein wrote a lengthy opinion that followed the historical
antecedents of the Seventh Amendment and criticized Rhone Poulenc
and its progeny:
[T]he Framers’ main objective in drafting the Seventh
Amendment was to limit the ability of an appellate court,
specifically the Supreme Court, to review de novo and
overturn a civil jury’s findings of fact. Nowhere is there
an indication that the Framers intended to constrain the
trial judge’s substantial discretion to employ appropriate
mechanisms of jury control.63
the harms alleged by plaintiffs are invariably bound up in their claims that cigarettes
caused their injuries[,]” which presents individualized questions.); In re Masonite Corp.
Hardboard Siding Prods. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D. 417, 425-26 (E.D. La. 1997) (stating
that “bifurcation of manufacturer conduct and comparative negligence can violate
Seventh Amendment considerations by having the second jury reconsider the decided
factual question of manufacturer negligence.”); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (bifurcating general and specific causation
may violate the Seventh Amendment because of the “genuine risk that the general issue
would be ‘redecided’ by the subsequent jury.”).
59. Castano, 84 F.3d 734, 739-40.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 744-45.
62. Id. at 751 (stating that in a comparative negligence case, “[t]here is a risk that in
apportioning fault, the second jury could reevaluate the defendant’s fault, determine that
the defendant was not at fault, and apportion 100% of the fault to the plaintiff,” which
violates the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause).
63. Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); see also
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The Second Circuit cited to Judge Weinstein in rejecting the
Castano decision, and encouraged the use of FRCP 23(c)(4), with little
concern over the Seventh Amendment argument.64 Several other
opinions have followed suit, including courts in the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits.65
Meanwhile, Judge Posner seemed to change his views on class
actions. In a 2003 decision, Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp, the
defendant appealed via FRCP 23(f), from the grant of class certification
in a groundwater pollution case.66 The district court certified the “core
questions” of “whether or not and to what extent [Met-Coil] caused
contamination of the area in question.”67 Writing for the court, Judge
Posner wrote that judicial economy favored treating the general liability

Woolley, supra note 15 at 509 (quoting Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History
of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 679 (1973)) (“Anti-Federalists feared
the federal courts would oppress local debtors on behalf of out-of-state creditors. The fact
that retrials on appeal in the Supreme Court might be by jury provided little comfort. As
Professor Wolfram has explained, ‘the last resort for the hounded debtor was a hopefully
sympathetic jury in his local federal court.’ In addition, Anti-Federalists were concerned
about the cost of retrying cases in the capital. For these reasons, the Anti-Federalists
sought not only to preserve the right to jury trial, but to ensure that no retrials whatsoever
would take place in the Supreme Court.”).
64. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that bifurcation does not violate the Seventh Amendment, as long as
particular factual issues are not re-tried by a subsequent jury). The Second Circuit has
similarly supported issue certification in many opinions – so long as the issues do not
completely overlap, the jury has been properly instructed, and where certifying issues
would actually provide efficiency. See, e.g., Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2007) (instructing the district court on
remand from reversal of denial of certification to consider whether certification on the
issue of antitrust injury was warranted) (citations omitted); In re Nassau Cnty. Strip
Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting Castano and holding that a
court may certify a class as to a particular issue despite the fact that plaintiffs’ claims
taken together do not satisfy FRCP 23’s predominance requirement).
Contra
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co. 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that issue
certification was not available in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
case, alleging decades-long fraud on the safety of lower-tar cigarettes because issues of
reliance, injury, and damages were so great that issue classes would not promote judicial
economy). See Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding the
district court lacked a trial plan to ensure issues would not overlap and be re-examined).
65. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting Castano,
holding that district court correctly found that common issues predominate, despite the
need to determine damages on an individualized basis); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs.,
Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003).
66. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003).
67. Id. at 911.
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issues in “one fell swoop,” leaving individual issues to be decided after.68
Posner referenced Rhone Poulenc, but not the Seventh Amendment
discussion. Rather than fret over a “reexamination,” Posner suggested as
some solace to the defendants that if the class jury was wrong about the
extent of defendant’s misconduct, the individual juries would serve as a
backstop to prevent a miscarriage of justice.69
While these more recent decisions have sidestepped (or sideswiped)
the Seventh Amendment holding in Rhone Poulenc, what has been
ignored is the more basic question of whether or not defendants’
Constitutional rights are actually violated when the issue certification is
granted. Whose rights are at issue when a potential second jury
“reexamines” the decision of the first “issues class” jury? Can the class
members—concluding that some class treatment is better than none—
waive their reexamination rights under the Seventh Amendment, thereby
removing the potential Seventh Amendment violation as a basis to deny
issue certification?

68. Id.
69. Id. at 912 (“First, the two questions that the judge has set for class treatment –
whether there was unlawful contamination and what the geographical scope of the
contamination was – are not especially complex. Second, even if these questions are
answered against Met-Coil, the consequences for it will not be catastrophic. The
individual class members will still have to prove the fact and extent of their individual
injuries. The need for such proof will act as a backstop to the class-wide
determinations.”); see also Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir.
2004) (relying on FRCP 23(c)(4) to certify a RICO claim as to fraud, without reference to
the Seventh Amendment).
Very recently, the Fifth Circuit seemed to ignore Castano’s imperative that a class must
meet certification under FRCP 23(b)(3) before consideration of issue certification. In
approving a settlement of the economic damages for business hurt by the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf, the court blithely noted that the district court could have
simply considered liability issues separately, undercutting BP’s argument that Article III
required determining that each class members suffered an injury. In re Deepwater
Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “the district court anticipated that
‘issues relating to damages’ could and would be ‘severed and tried separately’ from other
issues relating to liability, in accordance with this court’s previous case law and Rule
23(c)(4) . . . This court has previously ‘approved mass tort or mass accident class actions
when the district court was able to rely on a manageable trial plan—including
bifurcation’ of ‘class-wide liability issues’ and issues of individual damages.”) (citing
Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2006)). The court
also cited with approval the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
stating, “[A] class action limited to determining liability on a class-wide basis, with
separate hearings to determine—if liability is established—the damages of individual
class members, or homogeneous groups of class members, is permitted by Rule 23(c)(4)
and will often be the sensible way to proceed.” Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d
796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013). Not once did the court cite Castano.
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III. The Seventh Amendment Should Not Present A Bar To Issue
Certification
Ever since Rhone Poulenc, defendants facing an issue certification
routinely present the Seventh Amendment “reexamination clause”
argument as the last line in a parade of horribles.70 But consider the
layers of speculation that underlie the supposed reexamination violation.
For example, the Castano court stated:
Another factor weighing heavily in favor of individual
trials is the risk that in order to make this class action
manageable, the court will be forced to bifurcate issues
in violation of the Seventh Amendment. This class
action is permeated with individual issues, such as
proximate causation, comparative negligence, reliance,
and compensatory damages . . . .
....
. . . At a bare minimum, a second jury will rehear
evidence of the defendant’s conduct. There is a risk that
in apportioning fault, the second jury could reevaluate
the defendant’s fault, determine that the defendant was
not at fault, and apportion 100% of the fault to the
plaintiff. In such a situation, the second jury would be
impermissibly reconsidering the findings of a first jury.
The risk of such reevaluation is so great that class
treatment can hardly be said to be superior to individual
adjudication.71
70. See, e.g., IMI Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification and in Support of Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony and Opinion
of Dr. John Beyer at 30 n.48, 55, In re Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. 1:05cv-00979-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL 2548951 (S.D. Ind. April 7, 2008) (stating that “because
impact/injury is an element of liability, the Seventh Amendment prohibits” bifurcation of
damages.); Defendants’ Motion to Decertify the Class at 16, In re Nw. Airlines Corp.
Antitrust Litig., No. 2:96-cv-74711-GCS, 2005 WL 3677173 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2005)
(“Whether and to what extent an individual class member was reimbursed goes directly
to the issue of whether that class member was injured by the alleged conduct. Because
the trial jury will be asked to decide on a classwide basis whether individual class
members have been injured, subsequent determinations by a different factfinder in a
‘reimbursement proceeding’ would entail constitutionally impermissible reexamination
of issues addressed by the trial jury.”).
71. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
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The emphasized words above highlight the nature of the possible
“reexamination.” Instead of conjecture, the court considering an issue
certification should remember “ripeness,” “standing,” and “waiver.”
Because a potential reexamination clause violation can only appear after
the plaintiffs prevail in the initial trial and a second jury fails to heed the
trial court’s instructions to consider only the issues before it, any
Constitutional infraction can only be ripe after a class plaintiffs’ victory.
Thus, under the doctrines of ripeness and standing, no defendant could
mount a legitimate Constitutional attack to issue certification at the time

added). While the Fifth Circuit has stood by Castano, see, e.g., Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 420 (5th Cir. 1998), it has deviated in some odd
situations. In Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999), the
court distinguished Castano in upholding an issue certification of workers at a floating
casino who sued for respiratory injuries related to second-hand smoke under the Jones
Act. Id. at 629. The court’s discussion of the Seventh Amendment appears to single out
comparative negligence as something that could be bifurcated, unlike causation:
In Castano, this Court expressed a concern that having one jury
consider the defendant's conduct and another consider the plaintiffs’
comparative negligence could create Seventh Amendment problems.
...
. . . [W]e would not find the risk of infringing upon the parties’
Seventh Amendment rights significant in this case. . . . In Castano,
we were concerned that allowing a second jury to consider the
plaintiffs’ comparative negligence would invite that jury to
reconsider the first jury’s findings concerning the defendants’
conduct. We believe that such a risk has been avoided here by
leaving all issues of causation for the phase-two jury. When a jury
considers the comparative negligence of a plaintiff, “the focus is
upon causation. It is inevitable that a comparison of the conduct of
plaintiffs and defendants ultimately be in terms of causation.” . . .
Thus, in considering comparative negligence, the phase-two jury
would not be reconsidering the first jury’s findings of whether
Treasure Chest’s conduct was negligent or the Casino unseaworthy,
but only the degree to which those conditions were the sole or
contributing cause of the class member’s injury. Because the first
jury will not be considering any issues of causation, no Seventh
Amendment implications affect our review of the district court’s
superiority finding.
Id. at 628-29 (citations omitted). But this distinction ignores that the first jury would still
be assessing what the floating casino knew about its supposedly inadequate ventilation
system, when it knew it, and whether it was negligent – all things the individual jury
could reconsider in the individual phase if viewed the same skeptical way as the court did
in Castano. It is unclear how the comparative negligence issue in Mullen avoids the risk
of reexamination any differently than the negligence and general causations in Castano.
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of class motion. Moreover, only the class plaintiffs would likely suffer
from a reexamination; if the first jury found for the defendant, the case
ends for every member of the class. As such, only the class plaintiffs
would have standing to raise a Seventh Amendment violation.
A. Standing When Challenging a Seventh Amendment Reexamination
Violation
Standing “is the threshold question in every federal case” and is a
bedrock requirement for a litigant wishing to raise a legal right:
In essence the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of
the dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves
both constitutional limitations on federal-court
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In
both dimensions it is founded in concern about the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a
democratic society.72
The Constitutional basis for establishing standing stems from the
“[Article] III judicial power [which] exists only to redress or otherwise to
protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s
judgment may benefit others collaterally.”73 Therefore, a “federal court’s
jurisdiction . . . can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has
suffered ‘some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively
illegal action.’”74 A “generalized grievance” is not enough; only the
party harmed may “assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”75
The standing requirement dooms the opposition of most defendants
raising Seventh Amendment objections to issue certification motions.
Because the potential of a Seventh Amendment reexamination scenario
is speculative at the time a defendant opposes class certification, no
actual injury has ripened.76 Second, even if a jury did revisit the findings
72. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
73. Id. at 499.
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal citations omitted).
76. The specter of a Seventh Amendment violation untethered to an actual injury to
a class defendants is displayed in Perry, supra note 3, at 742-43. Mr. Perry, a partner at
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of the first jury, it is the class plaintiffs who are likely wronged, and the
defendants cannot raise their violation to undo the class action.
1. Seventh Amendment Rights of Litigants Are Not Violated Until
An Issue Has Actually Been Reexamined
Overwrought speculation about what subsequent juries may decide
once the class trial moves to the next level will not suffice the “ripeness”
test for standing. The Rhone Poulenc court overemphasized a potential
conflict before one developed.77 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Supreme Court laid out specific requirements which must be met in order
for a plaintiff to claim a violation of their Constitutional rights.78
Primary among these was the element of personal injury.79 Specifically,
the Supreme Court found that in order to establish a personal injury, a
litigant must show that they are actually harmed by the Constitutional
violation.80 Moreover, the harm must be “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.”81
The possibility that a second jury could reexamine the findings of
the first does not meet the “actual or imminent” requirement to establish
personal injury. Both juries can examine overlapping evidence; the
reexamination clause only prohibits the second jury from deciding
factual issues that were common to both trials and essential to the

Gibson Dunn who represents large defendants in class actions, simply notes that the
potential for a reexamination raises sufficient “concerns” to support complete rejection
of issue certification to avoid any constitutional conflict:
The Reexamination Clause forbids two separate jury trials for the
same claims and facts. As the Court has stated in interpreting this
Clause, two jury trials may not be used for the same case “unless it
clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable
from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”
Claim elements and defenses, however, are not “distinct and
separable” from liability. . . . Therefore, “partial certification” raises
significant constitutional concerns, and the rule of constitutional
avoidance counsels against an expansive use of Rule 23(c)(4).
Perry, supra note 3, at 742-43.
77. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
78. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
79. Id. at 578.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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outcome.82 Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants are in any
“imminent” danger of harm because giving a second jury the opportunity
to potentially reexamine evidence that an initial jury already passed on
does not ensure that the second jury will actually reexamine the legal
issues and reach a contradictory verdict that deprives the initial party of
its litigation victory. Regarding ripeness, the plaintiff in Lujan
complained that by denying extraterritorial application of the Endangered
Species Act to activities supported by the U.S. that threatened animals in
other countries, her Constitutional rights would be violated if she were to
travel to another country, as she could not make a claim.83 However, this
concern lacked imminence because she did not have any concrete plans
to visit another country, nor could produce a plane ticket or a planned
date of travel, etc..84 Similarly, at the time of issue certification, it is far
from inevitable that a second jury will even be used, as the defendants
might win or the case might settle.
Not only is the possibility of a “reexamination” speculative but it
can be easily averted. The trial court can give verdict sheets to the juries
that limit what issues they may consider.85 The common issue jury can
be given specific issues upon which to render a verdict, and the
individual issue juries can be limited via verdict sheets to making
findings on causation and damages. For example, in Rhone-Poulenc,
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were at fault for not warning their
customers of the risk of HIV in their products from 1980-1985.86 If the
common issue jury held that the defendants could not have known of the
risks until 1983, but an individual issue jury sided with the plaintiff,
despite finding he used the products only before 1983, the trial court
82. Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1127-28 (7th Cir.
1999) (finding no Seventh Amendment violation where trial over airplane crash was
bifurcated between suit against pilot and manufacturer; passengers distinct legal theories
against defendants presented overlapping evidence that a jury could independently find
both defendants’ conduct were substantial factors causing the crash); In re Innotron
Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (bifurcation of anti-trust and patent
claims upheld despite likelihood that “most of the facts and issues in the patent trial
[were] overwhelmingly intertwined and overlapping with those in [the anti-trust
claim].”); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1112, 1117 (D. Del. 1984) (noting that the Seventh Amendment
is concerned about factual conclusions, not evidence: “The prohibition is not against
having two juries review the same evidence, but rather against having two juries decide
the same essential issues.”).
83. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 588.
84. Id. at 592.
85. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
86. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir. 1995).
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could throw out the contradictory verdict.87 This coincides with the more
recent and refined “backstop” understanding of the “individual issues”
jury that Judge Posner described in Mejdrech.88 If the class jury held
defendants were responsible for a groundwater plume that included
plaintiff’s property, but the individual jury found the plaintiff failed to
show any contamination (or
any actual damages due to the
contamination), the second jury has not “reexamined” the first jury’s
verdict in a manner that violates anyone’s Constitutional rights, let alone
that of the defendant. In addition, if needed, the defendant could also
move for judgment as a matter of law to enforce the specific terms of the
first jury’s intended verdict.89
2. The Reexamination Violation, if it Ever Arose, Would Most
Likely Affect the Class Plaintiffs, and Defendants would Lack
Standing to Object
The Rhone-Poulenc court reasoned that reexamination of an issue
could occur if the plaintiffs were to receive a favorable verdict from the
initial jury at the issue-class trial, and then if subsequent juries chose to
reexamine that favorable verdict when they decided the remaining issues
of each plaintiff’s respective case.90 But, if the plaintiffs lost the certified
issue of negligence, there would be no subsequent trials to determine
damages, and no risk of reexamination of the issues. In fact, it is likely
that in most issue certifications, the initial jury impaneled to hear the
certified issues will hear threshold issues such as liability, while
subsequent juries will decide subordinate issues such as damages. This
means that when a subsequent jury is impaneled, the defendant has
already been found liable for something, leaving the subsequent jury to

87. See Simon v. Phillip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting
that trial judges have historically been allowed to use procedural devices to exert control
over jury verdicts, including “remittitur, new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
demurrer to the evidence, directed verdict, special verdict and nonsuit.”); Woolley, supra
note 15, at 528 (noting prevention of contradictory verdicts, “can be achieved in the
bifurcation context by requiring that the formal findings of a jury be given estoppel
effect. Provided later juries respect the rules of direct estoppel, the second phase of a
bifurcated proceeding cannot be used to evade limits on review.”).
88. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003).
89. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 396 (2006)
(stating that “a party in a civil jury trial that believes the evidence is legally insufficient to
support an adverse jury verdict will seek a judgment as a matter of law”).
90. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995).
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decide individual matters like causation and damages91 or whether the
plaintiff relied on a misrepresentation.92 At this point, there are only two
options for the subsequent jury: either it can accept the verdict of liability
that the initial jury found during the class trial (this is what it must do as
a matter of law, and what it is presumed to do);93 or it can “go rogue,”
and potentially violate the Seventh Amendment by reexamining and
negating the findings of the first jury. On the remote chance the
subsequent jury “goes rogue”, then the only party that can be harmed is
the previously victorious class plaintiff. The defendant is not harmed by
the reexamination but instead gets a windfall – thereby lacking standing
to complain.
B.

Constitutional Rights, Such as Those Granted by the Seventh
Amendment, May Be Waived

“Although the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, like all Constitutional
rights it can be waived by the parties.”94 This is especially well settled in
civil litigation, where “[u]nlike other Constitutional rights, however, an
intentional relinquishment of the right is not required for waiver; the
right to a jury trial can be waived by inaction or acquiescence.”95 The
waiver of a Constitutional right is enforceable so long as it is made
knowingly and voluntarily.96 In fact, many of the rights accorded by the
Bill of Rights can be waived under the same “voluntary, knowing, and
informed” standards.97
91. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding district
court correctly ordered a trifurcated trial–one trial for issues of liability, “one trial on
exemplary damages and one on compensatory damages”).
92. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004);
In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001).
93. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (endorsing the “crucial
assumption that the jurors followed the instructions given them by the trial judge”)
(quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Woolley, supra note 15, at 526 n.136 (noting “the most invariable assumption
of the law that jurors follow their instructions”) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S.
200, 206 (1987)).
94. In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 723, 726 (3d Cir.1998) (citing United States
v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 621 (1951)).
95. Id. at 726.
96. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
97. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (“Our precedents also
place beyond doubt that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a
defendant, so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”);
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Similarly, any party that is seeking an issue certification under Rule
23(c)(4) has the ability to waive its rights under the Seventh
Amendment.98 As part of their motion to certify (in an abundance of
caution), the plaintiffs who seek issue certification could waive their
Seventh Amendment right against reexamination upfront, removing this
potential problem and possible defense objection. As part of the trial
courts’ examination of adequacy of counsel, the court can assess if the
waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. This
assessment may occur at the class hearing, and the class representatives
can be asked about waiving any reexamination issues during their
depositions.
IV. Conclusion
Issue certification is not always appropriate. It may be that
litigating the common issues fails to appreciably save any resources, or
that small individual damages cannot incentivize a consumer to step
forward and sue, even armed with a liability verdict. Also, there must be
some mechanism to ensure fair compensation for the class counsel that
did the heavy lifting in trying the common issues to a successful verdict
in the absence of a class fund that results when both liability and
damages are tried together. But the bogeyman of the potential of a
Seventh Amendment violation from a “reexamination” by a second jury
has too long been a throw in argument against class certification by class
defendants clinging to a “divide and conquer” strategy that favors those
with greater litigation resources. Trying common issues limits the ability
of a defendant to force plaintiffs to relitigate issues, dissipating some of
their advantage. Based upon the well-settled law of standing and
ripeness, the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause is not a
reasonable basis to deny certification of common issues. Without that
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87-88 (2004) (“While the Constitution ‘does not force a
lawyer upon a defendant,’ it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent) (internal citations omitted); Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (holding that the keystone to voluntary waiver of a Fourth
Amendment right is the question of reasonableness).
98. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). Of course,
waiver of all Seventh Amendment rights happens constantly in America due to the
proliferation of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts.
See Hearing on Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair to
Consumers? Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5 (statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Staff Attorney); see also AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
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concern, the American legal system can move one step closer to the
liberal standard of judicial discretion for issue certification intended by
Rule 23.
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